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Peggy DesAutels and Joanne Waugh
We offer this volume as a contributio n to the ongoing conversa tion th at goes under the name of "feminist ethics." This conversation took an exciting and inte resting turn recently at the Feminist Ethi cs Revisited Conference; many of the essays in this volume articulate ideas and analyses first prese nted there. 1 The term feminist ethics was used broadl y at this conference-as it is again here-to refe r to the perspectives on women 's experience that come into view at the intersections of ethics, politi cs, philosophy, and literature . Earlie r generations o f philosophers-both male and female-have fo und that the experiences of women fit neithe r easily nor neatly into the ca tegories favored by trad itional, mainstream philosophy. That the dominant discourse of philosophy still strains to accommodate wome n's experiences has prompted fe minist ph ilosophers to go beyond the usual boundaries, esp eciall y in ethics. In her contribution to this volume, "Seeing Power in Morality: A Proposal for Feminist Naturalism in Ethics," Margaret Urban Walker succinctly summarizes feminists' achievements in e thics. "Feminist ethiCS, " Walker w rites, "is inevitably, and fundame ntally, a discourse about morality and power" (4) . Our volume emphasizes this essential insight of fe minist ethics.
Philosophica l e thics typically neglects power, taking its subject to be the ideal or transcendent nature of morality-something finer and higher than mere p ower. When attention is paid to questions of power, it is typica lly seen as standing in opposition to morality. Walker decries this neglect and denies this opposition at the same time that she insists that the concept of morality should be neithe r reduced to power no r eli minated in its favo r. Wa lke r insists on the importance of morality for challenging the legitimacy of dist.ributions of power, fo r those w ho are powe rless have ne ithe r gro unds nor mea ns for ix x challenging existing p ower relations without appealing to morali ty. Indeed , this is one reason why feminist moral discourse asks whether and how power is distributed equally and unequally, whe the r and how it ga ins legitimacy or sustains itself illegitimately, and whether and when people having power over others is, in Walker's words, "mo rally necessary, arbitralY, or catastrophic" (5) , To answe r su ch qu estions Walker suggests that we recognize that morality "is a disposition o/pOWe1'S tbmugb a n arrangement oJ resp onsibilities," that these responsibilities and powers are both social and distinctively moral, and that they are no less "natural" for being either or both (6) . Indeed , such powers and responsibilities are "natural" because they a re necessalY in order for human societies to fun cti on, and human life naturally p erpetuates itself through human societies.
Moral concepts can be abstracted from social practices only at the risk of missing the part of their meaning-typically the largest part-that is embedded in the social practices that gene rate the conce pts. This is not to den y the moral authority of morality; rather, it is to insist that there is a specifically moral understanding of social practices, an unde rstanding that we might, following Walker, call the moral structure of these practices. Walker sees this moral structure in practices of responsibility; and with the understanding of responsibility comes the understanding of agency and the values, positive and negative, that attach to those agents to w hom we differe nti ally ascribe responsibility. It is our understanding of these practices and the concep ts embedded in them that grounds the trust that is recognized in the velY n otion of the moral authority of morality . Of course, these practices may be sustained by powe r and authority that is not moral, a fact that is often more transparent to those who have a lesser share of power and resp onsibility and are accordingly valued-or devalued-by those with a greater sh are .
Walker provides an example of how a concept like the social co ntract-as a contract between equals-when analyzed in terms of the social practices that make sense of it, defines itself in terms of the powers that white male equals have ove1 ' those who are neither male nor white and thu s are not equals. 2 As Walker puts it, "Equals do not just have different and grea ter powers and entitlements relative to those below: they are defined as equal by their shared entitlements to and powers over those below" (1 2) . Indeed , / the logic of equality that allegedly stru ctures the Enlightenment project of moral universalism may also be what renders the project impossible . There is still another problem with this project of building an ethics and p olities on consensual equ ality, for as feminist philosophers have insisted , within the scope of Our moral concern we find those who are not equal because of their immaturity, disability, incapacity, vulnerability, and dependence. Such inequality, as Walker notes, describes or will describe all of us at some point in our lives-whatever our rational agency at this time . Questions about our responsibilities to those with whom we have unequal p ower relatio nships Introduction xi thus move us to undertake political a nalyses that invoke concepts othe r than a social co ntract between and among equals, ana lyses in which questions must be asked about the exercise of power, the same qu estions that those working in feminist ethics ask. These politica l analyses also provide us with occasions on w hich to develop the solidarity necessary for feminist politiCS and ethi CS, as Uma Narayan suggests in "The Scope of Our Concerns: Reflections o n 'Woman ' as the Subject of Feminist Politics." Such occasions for deve loping solid arity are crucial in Na raya n's analys is beca use she find s the suggestion that fe minist politiCS groups togethe r all experie nces of those who ide ntify th emselves as women to be a nonstarte r. Indeed, Narayan takes this to be the question that curre ntly faces feminist ethics: "Ca n the scope of feminist analyses, and the agend a of feminist mo ral and political e ngagement, be justifi ably restricted to 'issues pertaining to the interests of wome n'I" (15). That feminist politiCS should take its project as fighting for the interests of all women had been the conclusion of radical feminists , w ho took "women" as the name of a group whose members had been syste matica lly oppresse 1 because they were women. But the analyses presented by radica l feminists were the mselves contested by poor women, women of color, and women of diffe ring sexual orientation(s) as not taking their experiences into account. One response to these objections, w hich Narayan labels the "Differences Critique," is to include the interests of these neglected groups, expa nding the view of women 's interests to form what Na rayan calls the "Jigsaw Puzzle Picture Model of Women 's Interests." But if all of women's interests do not fit togeth er as this model suggests, then fe minist politicS (a nd feminist ethics) may not enta il advanCing the interests of all women. What should drive feminist politics and feminist ethiCS, Narayan suggests, is solida rity based on shared p olitical analyses and not necessa ril y the expe rie nce of being o ppressed by patriarchy. Solidarity based on shared po litics ca n lead to privil eged women-and men-working against their own privileged intere ts and with and for women whose oppression results from some combinatio n of gender, race, class, and sexual orientation. Gender is not me rely added to these other facto rs; the releva nt metaphor for this combinatio n is chemical, not mechanical. Because one cannot cut off the effects of gen l .e r from those of race, class, and sexuality, Naraya n suggests that the "Oppressed Ide ntity-Based Cuto ff Model" of political membership may deprive feminists of theoretical insights and practica l stra tegies fo r dea ling w ith oppression.
Questions about how analyses of inequality and oppr ssion affect conceptions of agency have received a good deal of attention from feminist philosophers, and there has been some concern that the very notion of agency as it has been formulated in traditional ethics is fata lly compromised insofar as it assumes, first, that moral agents are equal in power(s) and , second, that autonomy should be identified with those who are depended on rather than dep endent. Not only is this notion of the eq uality of moral agents defined, as Walker obselves, in te rms of their sharing entitlements to and pow ers over unequals, the concepts of dependence and independence invoked in such a notion themselves depe nd on d istinguishing-artificiallybetween the public and the private spheres and on identifying morality with public behavior. Feminist ethics is left w ith a host of problems to add ress, not the least of them being whe ther and how moral damage is done to oppressed people by diminishing their conception of themselves as mo ral agents. Especially pressing a re questions of how the concept of moral agency may be admitted into feminist ethics: What formulation(s) and what metaphors are and should be Ll sed to introdu ce the concept? And how w ill certain formulations and metaphors affect the mo ral structure(s) of the social practices of which they are a part?
Diana Tietjens Meyers takes up the question of how social categories of gender affect women 's conceptions of themselves in "Social Groups and Individual Identities-Individuality, Agency, and Th eOly." Meyers argu es for a conception of identity that recognizes the pow er that social constructs of gender exercise in individual identity, despite individual cho ice. The conflict that may ensue between a socially mandated conception of identity, in w hich one is a member of a subordinated group, and a sense of a self that belies this social identification may result in a sense of alien atio n, but it is a sense of alienation that Meyers regards as desirable insofa r as it provokes moral reflection and e mancipatory social criticism. Reflection on the ways in which gender identities do and do not affect an individual's sense of pe rsonal identity makes an individual self-conscious in a way that enables social critiqu e . That some feminists have rejected theories of gender because they seem incompatible with individualized identities res ults, Meyers suggests, from a tende ncy to see gender theories as essentialist, tb at is, as conforming to a social-scientific epistemic model based on inductive gene ralizations about women. As universal generalizations abo ut women, gender theories are easily disconfirmed by empirica l data, despite the fac t that elements of these theories resonate with the experiences of many women. Inspired by Marilyn Frye's suggestion that we regard gender theories as metaphors that provide insight and understanding witho ut asse rting ide ntity or equivalence between things,3 Meyers suggests that we can do justice to gender theories that, in turn, do justice to some women 's expe rience by viewing them as we do literary texts. Ju st as interpretations of literalY texts seek support in passages from the texts and address seeming in consistencies between the interpretation and other parts of the text, theories of how social constructions of gender affect individual identity provide diffe rent p ersp ectives on the ways in which gender-as well as class, race, and sexuality-is constitutive of an identity that is nonetheless p ersonal and individua l. In reading gender theories of ide ntity describing other socially subordinated
In trod uction
x iii grou ps as we would literary texts, we must pay attention to the rhetorical va lue of th e universalist tone of these theories, fo r this tone functions in a way similar to hyperbole and shouting: it quells disagreeme nt and dissent. The goa l, then, must be to generate theories of gender-and social practices that employ them-that allow members of subordinated groups to find their voices.
In "Identity and Free Agency," Hilde Lindemann Nelson looks at the power that some texts-ones she refers to as master narratives-have in structuring the identities of me mbers of oppressed groups and how they may find their voices through counterstories. Drawing on narratives fro m nurses, Nelson illustrates how "a powerful group's misperception of an oppressed group results in d isrespectful treatment that, as in the case of the nurses, can impede group members in cany ing out their responsibilities" (50). These master narratives are morally oppressive to members of subordinated groups insofar as their capacity for normative competence is denied or diminished by the narratives. Nonnative competence entails not only that one is able to understand moral norms and act accordingly but also that one is capable of normative seif-disclosure--that one may "reveal who one is, morally spea king, through what one does" (55).
Revealing oneself as a moral agent is a complex affair. One must see oneself as a moral agent, as morally trustworthy. But, if one sees oneself as a moral agen t, this requires, in turn , that othel''S see her as a moral agent and understand her action not only as a moral action but also as a moral action of a specific kind. Thus is a person's identity a function of how others understand w hat she does, as well as how she understands w hat she does, and thus is free agency a function not only of an agent's capacities and abilities but also of how others view her capacities and abilities. How others see her contributes to her understanding of herself-of what she can and should do. This gives others power to harm a person by depriving her of the identity of a morally competent agent-what Nelson calls "the harm of deprivati on of oppo rtunity"-and, in so dOing, by contributing to he r own sense of herself as having limited or diminished moral agency-what Nelson ca lls "the harm of infiltrated consciousness." In some cases, such as that involving the narratives of the nurses cited by Nelson, this harm can be repaired by mea ns of a counterstolY that aims at changing not only the perception that the powerful have of the oppressed group but also an oppressed person's perceptio n of herself.
But such harm is a function not just of the means used but also of the extent to which the identities of the oppressed have been structured by these maste r narratives. Depending, as Nelson says, on not just how but also when a counterstory is introdu ced, it mayor may not be possible to repair the harm of infiltrated consciousness or, at least, to right the wrong done to those w hose sense of self has been undermined by op pression. Nelson cites as a n example of someone with an identity beyond narrative re pair a person who has never formed any notion of he r free agency beca use of oppressive social stru ctures combined w ith personal domination in an intimate relationship .
Bat-Ami Bar On takes how others view her and how she views he rself as her starting point in "Violent Bodies." Bar On reco unts how she develop ed he r violent body first in respo nse to the taunts of othe r childre n, then in accordance with the customs and expectations of a Jewish-Israeli youth in postindepende nce Israel, then as an adult Israeli citizen in military service, and finally as a fe minist involved in a women 's antirape moveme nt in th e United States. Feminist suspicions and criticisms of violent bodies are grounded in the fact that it is the male vio lent body that is so often the means through which women experience vio lence, prima rily in the fo rm of ra pe and battery in their eve ryday lives and during wartime . But w hat, Bar On asks, are the ethica l implications of her "violent body"-a body that is ready to fight and habituated to resp ond to violence w ith violence with little or no conscious reflection about this response? To fra me her analysis Ba r On turns to Hannah Arendt, whose work on violence is perhaps the most sustained thinking about violence undertaken by a fe male philosopher-or a male philosopher, for that matter. 4 For Arendt, violent action can o nly be justified on ethico-political grounds, and because, as Bar On points out, we are limited in our ability to predict and control w hethe r any action, including a violent one, will achieve the end for which it is the means, violent actions mu st be limited in scope and can be justified only for the short term. (Violence in self-defense is unproblematic because the danger is clear and present and the end justifying the means is immediate.) Political ends can thus justify instrumental viole nce and instruments like viole nt bodies, as long as violence is being used to halt-and not to p romote-the decline qf p olitical p ower. Viole nce must always be backed by and restrained by political power, that is, the conscious and concerted action of a gro up of people working together not out of self-interest but o ut of solidarity-out of care and co ncern for one another and the world.
This Arendtean sense of p olitical differs from standard feminist usage in w hich violence against w ome n is political because it is made possible by a systemic matrix of domination and submission. For Arendt, systemic domination does not deserve the appellation p olitical because people working together in concert and solidarity are central to her meaning of the term. Bar On observes that, pace Arendt, w ho objected to feminism insofar as it was motivated only by women's self-interest and not by care for the world, women's self-defense can be seen as a political project in an Arendtean understanding of the te rm, as can the production of violent female bodies. Because women's project of producing vio lent bodies serves as an "interruption of the status qu o . . . w hat otherwise would have proceeded automatically" (71), Bar On argues that the p roduction of women 's vio lent bodies is transgressive. As transgress ive, Bar On considers it justified ethicopolitically-as lo ng as women do not transgress boundaries "inhumanely" and "destructively" and rema in aware of, and wary about, the seductive nature of violence (71).
That feminist ethics develops a theoretical framework and political strategies to contest the exercise of oppressive power is also of concern to Lisa Tessman , Margaret A. McLaren, Ba rbara S. Andrew, and Nancy Potter, each of whom analyzes how virtues of character and their realization in habituated actions contribute to these projects. Using a critical virtue ethics framework, Lisa Tessman argues that what is morally objectionabl e about oppression is that it interfe res with human flourishing and that it does so for targeted social groups in a systematic way. OppreSSion does this by preventing or restricting access to "external goods" but also by preventing or hindering one in the development and exercise of the virtues a nd , in so doing, precluding one from acquiring a character that is part of a good life . Of particular concern to Tessman is that we examine how moral damage hinders members of op pressed groups from effectively resisting their oppressio n at the same time as we avoid dehumanizing the morally damaged group by treating that group as "a p roblem. "
Analyzing how oppressive forces can interfere with human flourishing requires not only that we augment Aristotle'S list of the factors interfering with fl ourishing by noting the systematic nature of this interference. We must also add goods that Aristotle did not recognize, including goods that are not captured under distri butive paradigms. Of primaJy importa nce to Aristotle, of course, is the acquisition of those virtu es the exercise of which results in a good life. Tessman adds the accompa nying realization that if "there is injustice already at work in the formation of character, the fact that something is based on character does not imply that it is not also rooted in an oppressive social system" (82). The task-as Tessman, echOing Claudia Ca rd, reminds uss-is that of distinguishing the insights of the oppressed from the moral damage that results from oppressio n. Such damage would include the failure to develop self-esteem, the fear of being conspicuous, and the tendencies to dissemble and to ingratiate oneself or identify w ith one's oppressors. Such character traits typically develop as sUlv iva l mechanisms when one lives under conditions of oppression, but this does not mean that they are not morally damaging as well. Indeed, some psychological traits are doubly damaging from a moral perspective insofar as they help to convince the members of the oppressed grou ps that their circumstances are the result not of systemic structures and forces but of their own flawed characters and psyches.
To acknowledge that some of us have the bad "moral lu ck" to be members of oppressed gro ups does not, however, re lieve us of all mo ral responsibility fo r our characte rs, even if th eir formation does not lie comple te ly w ithin o ur co ntrol. There is, of course, conside ra ble risk of harm / xvi DesAutels and Waugh to membe rs of oppressed gro ups in speaking of moral damage . Tessman illu strates this risk in recounting how the concept of the "damaged black psyche" became the justifi cation for opposing changes in oppressive social structures and forces. This argument proceeds from the ass umption that once the psychic damage has been done , the repai r needed sh o uld come from neithe r economic ass istance nor political empowerment but, rather, from the inculcation of "character-building" values, usually conce ived of as "family valu es" where the heads of h o useh old are male. Indeed, an extreme version of this argume nt reverses the causal sequence, arguing that character deficiencies are the ca use and not the consequence of such economic states as welfare dependency, despite the fact that historically economic opportunities for blacks have been so seve rely restricted, e ithe r in the number of opportunities or in the amo unt of compensation, as to be at times virtually nonexistent. Acknowledging tha t talk of moral damage is risky, Tessman points out that on e does not have to choose between working to change stru ctu ral causes of oppression and attempting to repair moral damage. Even more importantly , sh e suggests that changes in systemic structures and forces while necessary to undo the oppression of social groups may not be sufficient to repair the moral damage that is part of their oppression. Tessman thus proposes that radica l strategies of resistance to oppression include a critical virtue ethics, for, among other things, the moral damage done to members of oppressed gro ups may interfere w ith their abilities to form su ch strategies of resistance . Equally important, those w ho have been morally damaged because of oppression have "responsibilities of their own," Card has observed, "to their p eers and descendants. "6 In "Feminist Ethics: Care as a Virtue," Margaret McLaren provides an example of how a traditionally female trait such as caring can be a resource for a feminist ethics that bases its approach in critical virtue theory. The concept of care is problematic for feminist ethics beca use some theorists have argued that defining care as characteristic of women and other subordinated groupS is instrumental in their oppression. Such definitions can serve to "naturalize" and perpetuate oppression and can be morally damaging to the extent that women sacrifice their own interests for the interests of others, including those of their o ppressors. In so doing, women fail to develop their own identity , autonomy, resources, and moral agency. However, other theorists have considered care to be a female trait that provides a foundation for a fe minist ethics. McLaren argues that care ethics of the sort inspired by tlle work of Carol Gilligan is a f em.inine but not a fem.inist ethics because, among other things, it reinscribes the stereotypes of women that have stru ctured and pe rpetuated the oppression of women. Still, McLaren insists that the con cepts developed by feminist philosophers in response to care ethics provide us with the resources we need for a feminist virtu e ethics.
Int1'Oduction xvii
That care has been seen as a virtue of women rather than of men is prima facie problematic, for seeing virtues as gender related has been one way in which ethical theolY has contributed to and perpetuated oppression. Beca use virtue ethics is not innocent in the matter of women 's oppression does not mean, however, that it has nothing to offer to feminist ethics. McLaren, like Tessman, believes that a critical virtue theory has much to recommend it as a normative ethical theOlY, for, unlike deontological theories, virtue ethics assumes that the moral agent is an embodied member of a community and, in so dOing, addresses what is concrete and particular in moral situ ations. This becomes especially clear once we consider the attention that virtue theolY pays to the contributions of character, practical judgment, emotions, and moral perception in deliberating about actions and motives.
Virtue ethics holds that human flourishing-and how one's community contributes or does not contribute to such flourishing-is both a condition for and a conseq uence of a moral life. Following Joan Tronto, McLaren argues that the concept of care should be extended into the political realm w ith the consequence that the boundary between morality and politics-or the public and the private-is erased 7 When this boundalY goes, so should the notion that women's virtues are those of the domestic sphere in contrast to those virtues (which, if not feminine, are presumably masculine) that allow the formulation of abstract, "universa l," moral principles-principles that appear to be universal only in the public, and not the private, sphere. Finally, conceiving of care as a public or political virtue incorporates a concern for justice-the concern that care ethics allegedly slights. A feminist ethics that conceives of care as a political virtue will be a virtue ethics informed by feminist politics but not one in which care is the only virtue. McLaren suggests that other virtues in a feminist virtue theory wou ld include such things as feistiness and playfulness, in addition to more readily recognized virtues o f self-respect, openness, courage, and self-awareness.
The importance of contesting the image of the ethical woman as caring to the extent of being the "Angel in the House" prompts Barbara Andrew to look for another image of the ethical woman in "Angels, Rubbish Collectors, and Pursuers of Erotic Joy: The Image of the Ethical Woman. "8 Like McLaren, Andrew insists that the virtue of care should not be unde rstood as exemplifi ed primarily or solely by the domestic nurturer a nd proposes in stead th at we take seriou sly Michel Foucault's claim that ethics has its origins in "the ca re of the self. "9 As Foucault und erstands it, such care aims at a telos-"the kind of being to which we aspire w hen we behave in a moral way"-and thus does Andrew seek the telos of feminist ethics-the id eal image of the moral agent that inspires the ethical self to action. Andrew holds, as do Tessman and McLaren , that feminist moral action is political action and that care properly und erstood neglects neither the moral autonomy necessary for political action nor justice as both a means and an end of political action. Indeed , it is Andrew's cla im that the ideal of e thical relationship that ca re ethics has helped to formulate necessarily involves autonomy and that the recognitio n of this ideal p rovides care ethics with an alte rnative telos to that of the Angel in th e House . According to Andrew , the notion of e thical relationship ful fills the same fun ction in care ethics that the notion of autonomy does in ethical theo ries cente ri ng on justice: each acts as a condition for moral actions and judgme nts, but each de pe nds, in turn , on the existe nce of social conditions that provide the basic goods that enab le its exercise . Thus, feminist e thics needs a te los th at incorporates both care and autonomy.
The ideal image(s) of the ethical woman must recognize the importance of our desires both for connection with others and fo r autonomy; this is not accomplished by bifurcating between the (good) image of the Angel in the House and the (bad) image of the "Woman of the Streets." Following a suggestion of Drucilla Cornell's,1O Andrew considers the chiffionn ier-the junk or rubbish collector-as an image of the e thical woman. As a chiffionnie r, the ethical woman sifts through the remnants of philosophical theories and systems for usefu l strategies for feminist political and ethical action . As such , she gives up the dream of the perfect philosophical system or theory, the one that will guarantee her neither loss nor oppression, and accepts that she must improvise strategies that allow her to both engage the other and care for the self. Still , even this image of the ethical woman lacks an ingredie nt that Andrew thinks is essential to the image of the ethical w oman: the recognition of the imaginary, the domain in which, as Cornell notes, we as embodied, sexual creatures imagine ourselves as free and autonomous as we fulfill o ur desires for ourselves and for others.'! Cornell observes that the imaginary domain as such can only be accommodated within an abstract ideal of subjectivity: "Defining the pe rson only through a normative outline ... [is) the only way we can preserv e freedom of the personality. "12 In this way we employ the concept of the abstract person in our political analyses as one w ho determines for herself her values, including how best to love, even though these values have their source beyond her. In an attempt to do justice to the imaginary , Andrew turns to Simone de Beauvoir's image of woman as pursuing erotic joy as she creates "found art" and negotiates he r sexual and caring relationships with others in order to experie nce the joys of connection and of freedom. 13 For Beauvoir, the erotic relationship provides the p aradigm of our existence as subjects w ho care for ourselves and connect with others while also existing as Others for subjects w ho, too, desire both freedom and connection with us. Andrew concludes that w hatever ethical images we propose must acknowledge that we partiCipate w ith each other in relationships of power.
Nancy Potter also raises a question about our responsibilities to others in her chapter "Is Refu sing to Forgive a Vice?" Potter agrees w ith Tessman , McLaren, and Andrew that our moral evaluations should take the form not o f testing w he the r our actions are instances of a universa l moral principle but of asking w hethe r an action and the disposition to which it attests are deficient or excessive-vi1' tuaus or viciaus--in the context in which they occur. Potter notes that when moral theorists are asked about forg iveness they are prone to take the concept out of a religious context but are nonetheless w illing to assert its central p lace in o ur moral lives. Indeed, forgiveness is commonly viewed as moral beca use it indicates that one who has been wronged has overcome (justifiably) negative feelings toward the person or persons responsible for the harm or injury. These negative feelings include such feelings as resentment, and the presumption is that giving in to such negative feelings indicates some moral lapse or weakness on the part of the one who has failed to overcome them. An injured party w ho forgives believes that the harm or injury perpetu ated by the wrongdoer was morally wrong and that the w rongdoer is responsible for the action. Nonetheless, the injured party overcomes negative feelings toward the wrongdoer. In such a view, the act of forgiveness suggests that the wrongdoer in some sense transcends the harmful acts committed in the past. Accordingly, some mo ral theorists speak of the empathy w ith the wrongdoer that allows forgiveness and of the state of resto ration or reconciliation that is its aim.
But Potter conte nds that this vie w of forgiveness fail s to ta ke into account that when forgiveness is viewed as a virtu e there are situ atio ns in which its exercise can be seen as an excess or a deficiency. She notes that Je ffri e Murphy, for example, o bserves that we cannot be o bli gated to forgive another-o r seek restoration or reconciliation at any cost-if doing so indica tes that we lack self-respect, that we do not count ourselves as equal in moral importance to others .1 4 In Murphy's view, fo rgiveness must be compatible with respect for bo th oneself and othe rs as me mbers of a moral community. Using this criteri o n, there w ill be cases in whi ch both the action of forgiving anothe r and the disp ositi on to forgive will count as vices . Potter finds a case in which forgiveness w ould be a vice in Dorothy Allison's novel, Bastard Ou t of Ca rolin a 1 5 Bo ne, the protagonist in the nove l, suffe rs repea ted beatings a t the hands of he r stepfa ther-bea tings about whi ch he r mother knows and which she some times tri es to help he r da ughter esca pe . Howeve r, Bone's mother is una ble to choose her daughter's well -being over w hat she perceives as her own-re maining w ith her hu sband. Th e hu sba nd's ultimatum that his w ife choose him over her da ughter takes the form o f raping Bone, a rape that Bone's mothe r witnesses . Although Bone's mothe r and stepfathe r-a nd th e large r community of whi ch they are a pa rt-are victims of the o ppression suffe red by poor whites in Ame rica's rural SOLlth , an oppression that Bon e recognizes she shares w ith th e membe rs of he r family, Bone refu ses to fo rgive the m fo r her injuries . As Potte r notes, Bo ne has no reaso n to either forgive o r seek a reconciliation w ith her stepfather, w ho scarcely acknowledges h is wrongdoing or repents fo r it. The re is no positive re latio nship that Bone can restore w ith him, no point to any reconciliation . He r resentment of he r mothe r and he r fa ilure to fo rgive her, while clearly pa inful to Bone because she has given up the opportunity to recover her mothe r's love , may be necessary if Bone is to rea li ze that she has suffe red an inju ry that she did not dese rve . Thus may Bone 's re fu sal to fo rgive be see n, Potter su ggests, as the mean between excess and deficie ncy, fo r it signals her respect for herself-a nd othe rs-as membe rs o f a moral community, as moral agents w ho have a right to expect that injustice be punished. To refu se to allow a wrong to go unp unished , to refuse to fo rgive w hen to do so would be to diminish one's moral worth-and the re by co mmit a furthe r injury and injustice to oneself-can hard ly be co unted as a vice .
In "Gender and Moral Reason ing Revisited: Reengaging Feminist Psychology," Phyllis Rooney argues, too, that feminists should redirect their attention to the situational character of both gende r and moral psychology, specifically with the aim of e nhancing our understanding of moral reasoning. Rooney shares the concern expressed by many of the contrib utors to this volume that, in talk of care and justice as diffe rent voices in moral deliberations, we fail to notice that some of these voices a re the voices of the oppressed. Empirical studies conducted subsequent to those described in Gilligan's In a D~fferent Voice contest the claim that males are more likely than females to have a disposition for moral rationalism,16 that is, an enthusiasm for systematizing abstract rules and general p rinciples a nd for seeing the primaty values of mo ral agency as consisting in autonomy, consistency, a nd control. But the issue-as Rooney insists-is not merely a factu al one, for traditional accounts of moral reasoning have asserted men's superiority as a sex over women precisely insofar as men have this proclivity toward moral rationalism and wome n do not. Indeed , the justification that one so often finds fo r denying women moral rationality is wome n's p resumed inferiority at reasoning in this f ashion. Thus does Rooney express the same concern as other contributors that "in the fe minist literature there has been an insuf ficient reading against the grain of this traditional supposition" (1 56). She is especially concerned that the "care voice" attributed to women is characte rized as eschewing abstract principles in favo r of atte nding to the concrete aspects and contextual features of a mo ral situation. Rooney notes the imprecision with w hich abstract is used in such a characterization of the care ethic and points out that "abstracting from a (multifaceted) moral situation w ith respect to particular kinds of relationships and responsibilities among ind ividuals in it, and not w ith respect to the specific juridical rights of those individu als as autonomous agents, is one way of abstracting fro m the situatio n; another way involves abstracting with respect to the latte r and not the fo rmer (and these, clearly, need not be the only way of abstracting)" (156-57).
Introduction xxi
Rooney cites the psychological research of the past two decades that contests the view of earlier resea rch, like Gilligan's, according to which gender consists of more or less stable intrapsychic traits and dispositions. More recent research suggests that gender is also very much a social categoty, one that social regulation works to produce, perpetuate, and reinforce through gender norms, practices, and expectations that ca n be related to power differentials. Empirical studies suggest that modifications of the experime ntal situation can result in the appearance-or disappea rance-of gende r differences and that the politica l dimension of different research programs may do so as well . Prompted by the possibility that Gilligan's work "exaggerates d ifferences in disposition between women and men and overlooks diffe rences in social structure, such as power differentials that press for different behavior in the two sexes," Nancy Clopton and Gwendolyn Sorell have studied the extent to which gender is stable versus situ ational in instances of moral reasoning.t7 Their conclusion is that gender differences in the orientation of moral reasoning resu lt more from "differences in current life situation than from stable gender characte ristics."18 Rooney concludes that their study suggests that if care and justice apply to something, it is "to different kinds of moral situations in the kinds of responses they evoke" (161) .
Rooney takes this shift to a more situational view of gender in moral reasoning as an impetus toward a more situational view of cognition, but she stresses that situated reasoning is not th e same thing as contextual reasoning. "Care reasoning" may be contextual in a way that "justice reasoning" is supposedly not, but both kinds of moral reasoning-indeed, all kinds of moral reasoning-are situated. If one set of moral reasoners is prone to use "rights and principles" talk, we need to ask what it is about the situ ation of these reasoners that constrains them to reason this way. Beca use gender is often a salie nt characteristic of social loca tio n-one constructed and situ ated through particular norms and expectations-we may find that the gender of reasoners affects how they constru ct their "situatedness" and that, in specific social locations, men and women w ill construct their situ atedness differe ntly.
Of particu lar importance for ethics is that recent psychological work has given an active ro le to moral situations, prompting Rooney to remark that "situ ations, thoughtfully encountered , ca n bring morality to people: it is not simply that people bring morality (in the form of some 'inner' capacities and virtues, consistent sets of moral principles, and so on) to situations" (164). If ethicists have failed to recognize the extent to w hich this is tru e, it may be because the hypothetical situations often described whe n presenting moral problems are, as Rooney stresses, preselected for the limited forms of moral rationality they employ. Indeed, the models of cognition that they employ only sca rcely apply to moral problems as distinct from mathematical or logical ones. Whether the moral situation is found in life or in literature, humans employ more cognitive and affective capacities than those exhibited in the xxii artificial and hypothetical situations of ethica l theory. Rooney asserts that these cognitive and affective ca pacities, "with moral practice a nd the development of moral integrity, enhance rather than diminish the range of human reasoning ca pacities" (164) . Her recommendatio n is that feminist theorists operate w ith a more sophisticated picture of moral reasoning.
James Lindemann Nelson provides a complex p icture of moral reasoning in his "Constru cting Feelings: Jane Austen a nd Naomi Sche man on the Moral Role of Emotions." Nelson analyzes the views of moral reaso ning p resented by certain characte rs in Jane Austen's Sense and Sensibility and uses this analysis to critique Naomi Schema n's account of the role of emotions in moral cognition. 19 According to Nelson, Austen is conce rned not merely w ith how character is developed in the Dashwood daughters but also w ith the "set of socially created and renewed resources" that contribute to the construction of feelings, the direction of action, and the intelligibility of the world. Indeed, that Austen captures the effects that emotions have on moral reasoning w ith such clarity and elegance is what prompts Nelson to see her novel as a kind of exercise in moral cognition. Nelson suggests that we might view Austen herself as refuting the view, exp ressed by the cha racte r of Marianne, that "feelings as such reliably indicate where propriety lies." Nelson's own view of the emotions' contributions to mora l epistemology is more positive than Austen's, whose p osition in Sense and Sensibility a ppears also to be at odds with much recent feminist theory devoted to the positive role that emotions p lay in moral reasoning.
Nelson's take is also at odds with Naomi Scheman's views on the role of emotion in moral reasoning. Scheman holds that one of the primaly functions of emotions is to provide for the possibility of moral objectivity; emotions are socia ll y constru cted and essential to moral ju Igment. Nelson reads Scheman as saying that, as a social constru ction, an e motion is not a sta te of an individu al and does not have the kind of causal relations that provide for its existence as an entity independent of a social context. In Scheman's view, one could not expe rience an emotion outside of a social context that relates feelings, sensations, thoughts, and behavior in ways that provide for a cohere nt explanation; or, as Nelson observes, "Scheman's view ... entails that emotions are not identifiable in terms of their causal effectiveness outside of particular fo rms of social practices and explanations" (169).
For Nelson, the ontological status of emotions-whethe r they exist as functions of explanatOlY schemes o r whether they can be individuated apart from their role in social explanations-has important conseque nces for moral reasoning. He finds Scheman's account unclear regarding th conative or representational force of emotions-a force that he thinks is especially important w hen an e motion is discord ant w ith some of our beliefs. For Nelson, emotions can and often do reveal what is morally salient in a situation; in support of this claim he cites Richmond Campbell's analysis of fear as a repf ntmduct ion xxiii resentation that one is in imminent da nger and Alison Jaggar's account of the importance of "outlaw emotions."2o The problem Nelson finds with Scheman 's account of the moral role of emotions is that if emotions are functions of social explanations, the best that o utlaw emotions can do is identify alternative strategies to the dominant stra tegy under w hich these emotions are deemed "outside of the law." Yet Scheman sees confrontations between explanatory strategies as contributing to the search for moral objectivity; to attain it requi res a set of stable and sharable beliefs to emerge from chall enges by the w idest possible set of alternatives. Nelson does not see how emotions, as Scheman chamcten zes them, can contribu te to the resolu tion of these contests. If emotions only exist w ithin social explanations, can confli cting emotions indicate anything other than the existence of multi ple explanatory strategies? Ca n they indicate that one strategy is more morally defensible than another? Nelson thinks that emotions can represent the world as being a certa in way beca use they do have causal powers that individuate them independently of an explanatolY scheme . Citing Scheman's discussion of the disagreement between the mother and son in Torch Song Trilogy as to whether the on's feelings of loss over his deceased homosexual lover are analogous to the mother'S feelings of loss fo r her deceased husband, Nelson observes that there is nothing inferential or interpretative about the son's suffering. The son does not have to determine whether his e motion is located in an explanatolY scheme, and it is difficulL to believe that his mother would not recognize it as suffe ring-wheth e r or not it qualified on her sche me as conjugal grief. Or, as Nelson observes abo ut anger, "social p ractices might affect anger in many ways-trigger it, shape it, control w hat counts as acceptabl e expression of it, associate it a nd the forms of its expression in different ways according to gender or class-but not by p roviding it with the conditions that are essential to its having its identity at all" (1 79) . He notes, in a similar vein , that although in Sense a nd Sensibility Marianne and her sister, Elinor, have different views of the expl anatory scheme that holds that "feelings as such reliabl y indicate where propriety lies," Elinor does not deny that Marianne feels what she feels. Mari anne's defense of her emotions and of tlleir role in 'her view of propriety suggests tllat Marianne's emotions, pace Austen, may not have been so unrelia ble after all. Indeed, one might a rgue that these "outlaw emotions" represented the moral indefensibility of an explanatOlY scheme that causes women to fee l so much shame over having done so little harm .
In the concluding section of this volume contributors discuss how the insights of feminist ethics can be applied in specific social contexts. Joa n C. Tronto, whose Moml Bounda1·ies: A Political Argumentfor an Ethic of Care has influ enced many contemporary theorists-including contributors to this volume-urges th ose working in profeSSional ethics to fo llow feminists in their examination of the mea nings ass igned to moral principles in reflexive moral practices. In "Does Managing Professionals Affect Professional Ethics? Competence, Autonomy, and Care," she examines the claim-frequently criticized by those w hose job it is to manage professionals-that formulating and monitoring ethical standards for the professions is prop e rl y left to their practitioners. Professionals defend their right to dev ise their own sta ndards by appealing to notions of professional autonomy and professional comp etence. More than one feminist theorist has p ointed out the ways in which professionals tend to cast them elves as autonomous (masculine) fi gures who are nearly heroic, who have to struggle to maintain their au tonomy against controlling (feminine) managers w ho resort to manipulation and indirection. Tronto believes that the notion of managing p rofessio nals is ethically dubious, and she thinks that the best way for professionals to make this case is to extend their idea of competence beyond knowing and applying technical expertise to include "caring well. " "Caring well" should not be equ ated with providing a "reasonable standard o f care," w hich is usually understood to be a matter of conforming to a set of technica l requireme nts, for caring well involves focusing not merely on th e requireme nts of the moment but on the entire caring process. Accordingly, the competent professionalthe caregiver-must be not only technically competent but also attentive, responsible, and responsive . This will entail , among other things, using "multiple perspectives to make certain that care is not being distorted by relations of power and imposed or ignored needs" (192) .
But professional autonomy, and not just professional competence, needs to be reconceptualized if one is to find a solution to the problem of regulating professionals other than introducing nonprofessional managers. Tronto suggests that traditional views of professional autonomy tend to see p rofessio nal practice as consisting of a relationship of only two parties : professio nal and clie nt (patient) . But this picture neglects the extent to w hich professional activities as they are currently carried out involve contri butions from a number of other professionals. Tronto notes e mpirical studies suggesting that the greater the extent that professionals see tl1emselves as a team and to the extent that they are w illing to see each othe rs as equals and to acknowledge their vulnerabilities to other members of the team , the less likely they will be to find tl1eir work stressful and the more likely the team w ill be effective. Professionals who see themselves as separated from others w ith whom they w ork-and from their clients-because of differentials of power, distance, and professional hierarchies are less likely to communicate and acknowledge the possibility of error. Tronto su ggests that professional competen ce should be understood as a quality exhibited not so much by individuals as by teams or groups of profeSSionals. Professional au tonomy may then be seen as requiring profeSS ionals to take resp onsibility fo r the orga nizations of their professions, including the ir relationships w ith other professionals. In so doing, all professionals need to see the mselves as similar to those o f us in society who also give care and notas markedly different from others because of their professional competence. They need to see professional ethics as not so different from the ethical responsibilities of people in society generally.
The self-definition of many professionals emphasizes having expert knowledge-and a "calling"-that differenti ates them from others. Thus do they claim to be self-regu lating, wrapping themselves, as Tronto says, in their "cloak of competence" and denying that nonprofessional managers are qualified to challenge their professional judgment. Tronto suggests that professionals are, perhaps, even more concerned than others to assert their autonomy and demand the kind of self-control denied others for fear that their professions will be seen as like the more "feminine " caring professions. Given the extent to which contemporalY society seems committed to "flat hierarchies," professionals may worry that their work is being devalued, and they may feel the need to reassert its value. But defending the value of one's own profession by devaluing the work of others seems unlikely to be a successful strategy in the long run. As a result, Tronto proposes that the professions give up their claim to a special status based on their posseSSion of expelt knowledge that differentiates them from others. She urges, instead, that they acknowledge that they are able to care for others as a consequence of their competence and that caring well requires work ing with other professionals. Finally, she urges them to view caring well as central to the practice of all professions. They will then hold themselves and others with whom they work to the same standard as we would hold anyone else in societyto a standard that includes the responsibility to care for others.
Natalie Brender is also concerned with care as an ethical concept in the public sphere. Brender begins by recounting historical antecedents in which ethical theorists, usually men, have expressed anxiety about the shortcomings of those, usually women, who allow emotions or emotional dispositions such as care to dictate actions and policies in the public realm. Still , care can be a problematic concept in the political sphere, as Brender notes in her discussion of humanitarian relief. Suffering is prolonged rather than reduced if and when humanitarian relief permits political power to remain with those who are responsible for initiating and perpetuating the conditions causing the suffering. Brender argu es that we must cultivate a degree of analytica l detachment when responding to graphic representations of the suffering of those suffiCiently distant from us that we are unceltain of the suffering's causes and the consequences of our financia l help. Brender cites Margaret Walker's work on representational practices and mora l recognition to argue that the "moral graphics" of many calls for humanitarian relief seem designed to block recognition by the audience that the suffering being represented is occurring in a specific sociopolitical and economic context. 21 Brender takes Walker's implications to be that "such a failure of recognition is not consequentially but intrinsically ethically deficient" (209) and that "notwithstanding the images' xxvi DesAutels and Waugb success in producing a salutalY emotional and practical response, it is grounds for ethical criticism of the images that they foster a cognitive failure of recognition" (209) . Brender wants to insist, however, tha t analytical detachment of the kind required to respond ethically to these images is not incompatible with care . Drawing on the work of Joan Tronto, Brender suggests problematic aspects of Western audience members resp onding to linages of, say, starving childre n-and "showing that they care"-by w riting checks to relief agencies. Care, as Tronto has pointed out, diffe rs in terms of its object(s): one can care about someone in the sense of being generally concerned for her well-being and can care jorsomeone, w hich requires attention to another's needs-physical, emotional, spiritual, intellectual, and psychic. 22 Both of these can be done well or poorly, and to ca re well o ne must have knowledge about the needs, priorities, and demands of the sp ecific situation and choose the appropriate course of action using the correct means. Writing a check to a relief agency is not an instance of caring j or those w ho are suffering. Rather, it indicates that one cares about their suffering, althou gh not enough to investigate the cause(s) of their suffe ring. It is true that the humanitarian response may be inhibited if emotional appeals are accompanied by political analysis, but Brender notes that there is also a danger that those confronted with repeated images will cease to respond altogether. What makes both compassion and analytic detachment p OSSible-and not inherently incompatible-is the cognitive content as well as the corrigibility of emotions. Representations that fail to acknowledge these aspects of our emotionallives will, in the final analysis, be shOlt-lived and limited in their effectiveness to provoke responses-humanitarian or othelw ise.
Alison Bailey is also concerned with how feminism can inform analyses of political and social problems-but in a different context. She is concerned with how w e conceive of our responsibility for hate crimes in the communities of which we are members. She cites the crimes committed against Bridget Ward, an African American single head of household, after moving to Bridesburg, a suburban area sometimes characterized as one of "P hiladelphia's best kept secrets." Ward and her family moved o ut of their house in Bridesburg in less than two months because of repeated threats and acts of violence against them. Some residents of Bridesburg decried the hate campaign against the Ward family and insisted that they were not racists, that this campaign was the work of a "few bad apples," and that the community as a whole did not want to be blamed fo r the acts of violence. In a traditional view of collective responsibility-what Bailey refers to as the liberal response-a group is assigned responsibility for harms perpetrated by some of its members and it is the group's resp onsibility to hold the individual p erpetrators accountable for their (past) actions. The focus, as Bailey notes, is "on the relationships between individuals in groups and the causal contribution each makes to a particular state of affairs," (221) and the p erspective taken on this state of affairs is primarily down and backward, that is, those w ho neither contributed to nor were the victims o f the harmful act assign resp onsibility to other members of their group for w hat these members have already done. In this view, the residents of Bridesburg are discharging w hatev er resp onsibility they have in condemning the members of their community w ho performed the acts. Bailey, echoing concerns of other feminists, a rgues that the libe ral account of collective resp onsibility is inadequ ate in the case of hate crimes. It fails to acknowl edge that the identity of the victim is not incidental to the crime; rather, this individual was chosen to be the vi ctim of the crime beca use he or she was a member of a targeted group. As a result, this concepti on of collective resp onsibility fails to recognize the social and syste mic dimensions of the particular act of violence and thus conceives of respo nsibility too narrowly. "To fully address the harms resulting from practices such as rape, gay bashing, and racially motivated violence," Ba iley says, "our notion of resp onsibility must look beyond the moral mome nt of the crime itself" (222). Such crimes are a consequence not only of isolated intentions and actions of individuals but also of a social system of oppression, and thus w e must consider the roles that communities play in keeping in place systems that increase the likelihood of such intentions and actions.
As part of her analys is, Bailey cites Larry May's work on collective responsibility. May recognizes that the attitudes of a community toward minority groups may increase the odds that hate crimes will occur in a community .23 In May's account of shared resp onsibility, then, membe rs of a community are held responsible for their attitu des and should look not only "down and backwa rd " but also forward to changing the shared attitudes that foster a tolerance of hate crimes in the community. Still , Ba iley worries that this atte mpt to share responsibility focLlses only on the attitudes, feelings, and be havior of the majo rity members of the community and not on the minority members who have been the victims of the hate crimes. Bailey wonders how successful this endeavor to change the majority'S attitude toward the p opulation 's minority members can be if the latte r'S views and experie nces are not taken into consid eration. Indeed , she speculates th at the motivation for preventing any furth er hate crimes from occurring in this community may well be the result of shame rather than genuine concern for the w ell-being of others. The problem, as Claudia Card has observed, is that what we see when we look up and fOlward will vaJY w ith our social location 24 If one is "a t home" in one's communi ty, one may have a great dea l of difficulty not only in understanding why others feel ill at ease but also in knowing what causes them to have such feelings. Invo king Maria Lugones's notion of "world traveling,"25 Bailey suggests that we view oppressed members of a society as those who have to world travel out of necessity in the hope of escaping their oppression. In so doing, they are forced to travel to p laces where they are not "at home" and where even well-meaning othe rs may see them as outsiders. Those who inhabit positions of privilege travel to other worlds when, if, and how they choose and are at least predisposed to feel at ease wherever they are. As long as the "outside rs" remain the subject of conversation rather than a party to it, those who are privileged are unlikely to have any idea of w hether and how their actions-even wellintentioned ones-contribute to the "outsider" being ill at ease. In place of May's notion of shared responsibility, Bailey thus proposes a more opene nded account of responsibility in which we see ourselves as "acting with" rather than "acting for" the victims of hate crimes. In this account of responsibility, we need to ask how a community should respond to prevent future harmful acts as we ll as past ones. In so doing, we need to include in o ur discussions of responsibility those who have been-and may be-harmed by hate crimes. Bailey closes by citing the example of Billings, Montana, a community that mobilized itself in the face of a series of hate crimes against African Americans, Jews, and Native Americans. In this case, various organizations and community members, prompted by the suggestions and support of community leaders, demonstrated the ir opposition to those who had committed these hate crimes, their SUppOl1 of the victims of the crimes, and their intention of preventing any such crimes in the future. They engaged in su ch activities as attending services w ith the victims at their (defaced) church , disp laying menorahs in their windows, and repairing the damaged homes of the victims. Such acts of solidarity exhibit the kind of collective responsibility that empowers moral communities and their members.
Empowering moral communities and their members must be a goal of ethical theory as long as moral authority and moral responsibility are necessary for us to survive and flourish. Achieving this end requires an analysis of how power is implicated in the moral structure of our social practices. In other words, we must do what feminists who do ethics-especially those in this volume-have done: see power in morality and morality in power. This is, we think, no small achievement.
NOTES
1. The Feminist Ethics Revisited Conference was sponsored by the Department of Philosophy and the Ethics Center of the University of South Florida and took place in October 1999 in Clearwater, Florida. The palpable excitement of the participants at this conference was the impetus for us-along wi th Hilde Lindemann Nelson and Sa ra Ruddick, the editors of the Feminist Constru ctio ns Series at Rowman and Littlefield-to pursue tile publication of tllis volu me. It includes expanded versions of a number of the papers presented at tile conference and some essays not presented there. We would like to th ank all who contributed to the confe rence and to the volume.
